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price-setting game with incomplete information. In particular, I show how the speed of price
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and hence to more rapid price adjustments, but it potentially comes at the cost of an increased
exposure to informational noise. I extend my analysis to allow for other disturbances, showing
that higher-order uncertainty may account for the persistence of any kind of shock. Finally, I
reconsider the role of monetary policy and discuss how the central bank’s policy actions may
act as a focal point for market beliefs and hence aﬀect nominal and real adjustment through its
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What is the relation between the supply of money, prices and real output in the short run? In
particular, why do prices not adjust immediately after a money supply shock? The theoretical
literature around these two questions has emphasized two potential causess of incomplete nomi-
nal adjustment, each of which has led to important subsequent insights on the dynamics of price
adjustments and expectations about the conduct of monetary policy: lack of information or ”mis-
perceptions” originally developed by Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972), and adjustment costs or real
rigidities that prevent an immediate adjustment of pricing decisions.
Despite its theoretical success, the incomplete information model runs up against a powerful
criticism, when used as a descriptive model of business cycles: The theoretical model predicts that
prices should fully adjust once the information about aggregate shocks becomes available; however
most macro-economic data is available after only short delays, and incomplete information can
therefore not account on its own for the observed delays of price adjustment.
A recent article by Woodford (2001a) introduces strategic pricing into an incomplete infor-
mation model similar to Lucas. Woodford also alters the information structure, assuming that
information comes in the form of private signals to the price-setting decision makers, but the true
state never becomes common knowledge. His analysis develops a simple intuition why monetary
shocks have persistent real eﬀects, even when they are accurately observed by price-setters: al-
though ﬁrms may have precise information about the policy shock, they lack information about
each other’s beliefs; in fact, they have no information at all about what their beliefs are relative to
the population average. In an environment of strategic complementarity, however, precisely such
higher-order beliefs are necessary to forecast the behavior of other agents, and Woodford shows
that the existence of higher-order uncertainty can lead to substantial nominal adjustment delays.
The purpose of this paper is to expand and develop Woodford’s idea, and more generally, to
study the eﬀects of the market’s information structure on the inﬂation/output dynamics. My ﬁrst
objective is to explore the eﬀects of higher-order uncertainty in as simple and accessible a model as
possible, that is also suﬃciently ﬂexible to extend or adapt to other contexts. The second objective
is to study the role of the information structure in detail: Since the composition of the information
structure determines the degree of higher-order uncertainty, as quantiﬁed by the departure from
common knowledge, Woodford’s results suggest that it should also have an inﬂuence on nominalPublic Announcements and the Business Cycle 3
adjustment. Using some recent insights from the theory of global games, which emphasizes the
coordinating eﬀect of public information (cf. Morris and Shin, 2000; Hellwig 2002), this paper then
explores this link between the parameters of the information structure, in particular the precision
of public and private information, and the process of nominal adjustment. For these purposes, the
paper develops a version of the Lucas-Woodford model that is suﬃciently simple and ﬂexible to
study the dynamic implications of a whole range of information structures.
My analysis of higher-order uncertainty in price adjustment leads to a reconsideration of the
role and the conduct of monetary policy. The central bank is an important source of information
for market participants, either through disclosures, or through policy actions. A key aspect of
this information is that it is mostly public. Consequently, the conduct of monetary policy (i.e. the
choice of targets and instruments, as well as the policy rules and information disclosures) aﬀects the
market information structure, and hence the macroeconomic adjustment process. Whereas most of
the literature on the conduct of monetary policy emphasizes the desirability of "monetary trans-
parency" (interpreted here to mean the provision of public information) for monitoring purposes
in a principal-agent setting, taking the macro-economic dynamics as given, this paper argues that
the central bank’s information policy inﬂuences price adjustments through the market information
structure.
Before highlighting the paper’s main results, it will be useful to motivate my approach towards
modelling the information structure, in particular the separation of information into public and
private signals. Woodford studies an environment, in which individuals have access only to private
information. He bases his information structure on the famous ”island” paradigm, which is meant to
represent the informational diﬀerences between agents. Moreover, he appeals to limits in individual
information processing capacities. As argued by Sims (2001), this can account for a ”private signal”
information structure like Woodford’s, even when the relevant economic data is publicly observed.
While it is important to emphasize the role of diﬀerential information, the island paradigm has
the drawback that it allows for no informational interaction among decisionmakers; in other words,
in Woodford’s economy a price-setter has no clue about how his information compares to the
population average. More realistically, information processing within a market environment relies
to a large extent on interaction and communication, and in the process, decisionmakers do learn
about each other. In this respect, public disclosures and the processing of information by the media
play an important role, and Morris and Shin (2001) emphasize the importance of such publicly4 C. Hellwig
available information as focal points for beliefs. As we shall see here, publicly observed policy
actions have a similar role. The hypothesis that a decisionmaker has access to idiosyncratic and
public signals can therefore by literally interpreted as capturing the informational diﬀerences across
agents, whether they are the result of decisionmakers using diﬀerent sources of information, or the
result of limited information processing a la Sims, at the same time as taking into account the fact
that various channels of communication serve to coordinate expectations. The degree to which the
population is capable of processing information is captured by the parameters of the information
structure, in particular the relative importance of public information, and the overall degree of noise.
Alternatively, the separation of signals into public and private information may be motivated on
theoretical grounds: as discussed in Hellwig (2002), these informational parameters are related to
the degree of common p-belief, which quantiﬁes the departure from common knowledge, and hence
the degree to which individual decisionmakers are capable of eﬃciently coordinating their decisions.
The main results of this paper then discuss, how the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ depends on the
importance of higher-order uncertainty, measured as a function of (i) the degree to which pricing
decisions are strategic complements, and (ii) the parameters of the information structure. In
particular, the provision of public information reduces higher-order uncertainty and therefore leads
to a faster adjustment of prices and smaller, less persistent eﬀects of monetary shocks on output; on
the other hand, a higher precision of public information may increase the macro-economic exposure
to informational noise. This second eﬀect is important in particular when public information is
relatively noisy. The informational noise eﬀect is at the heart of the static model by Morris and
Shin (2001); indeed the formal analysis in this paper extends some of their results into a context
that is of interest to dynamic macroeconomic theory.
In the second half of the paper, I then explore some of the welfare implications of changes in the
market’s information structure. The key insight of this section is, as stated above, that the monetary
policy framework and the central bank’s information disclosures inﬂuence the adjustment process
of output and prices by altering the market’s information structure. Augmenting the model by an
objective function for the central bank along the lines of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983), I show that the provision of precise public information may serve as an implicit
commitment device against inﬂationary biases: By committing to disclose public information, the
central bank reduces the eﬀects of monetary shocks on output, thereby reducing the temptation toPublic Announcements and the Business Cycle 5
use monetary policy to stimulate output. However, the provision of public information may come
at the cost of increasing informational noise, if there is a lower bound on the precision of public
information.
The model provides closed-form solutions for prices and output in response to the underlying
aggregate demand and supply disturbances, as well as informational noise; the underlying infor-
mational parameters can potentially be inferred from the data, and the model itself leads to some
interesting testable implications. Moreover, the modelling approach appears to be suﬃciently ﬂex-
ible to be applied in other macroeconomic contexts, in which strategic complementarities play a
role, for instance investment or demand spill-overs. The paper thus makes the additional method-
ological contribution of proposing a solution technique for embedding higher-order uncertainty into
dynamic macroeconomic models, and the arguments proposed here suggest that higher-order un-
certainty coupled with strategic complementarities may be the cause of persistent eﬀects not only
of monetary shocks, but of other aggregate disturbances as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the main model, the
informational assumptions, and discusses the main analytical building blocks. Section 3 presents
the paper’s main theoretical results regarding the link between the information structure about
monetary shocks and the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ. Section 4 extends the analysis to allow for
higher-order uncertainty regarding other disturbances; in particular, it is argued that the Wood-
ford’s insight regarding the persistence of monetary shocks applies also to supply shocks. Section
5 augments the initial model to discuss the welfare implications of information provision by the
central bank, and informally discusses the role that the monetary policy regime, and in particu-
lar explicit monetary targets, have in reducing higher-order uncertainty. Section 6 concludes by
discussing the paper’s main implications and potential other applications.6 C. Hellwig
2 The Model
2.1 Set-up
There is a large number of price-setters in monopolistic competition a la Dixit-Stiglitz.1 When
solving the price-setter’s optimization problem, the ﬁrst-order condition implies that each price-
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operator conditional on i’s information set as of date t, =i
t,a n dr ∈ (0,1). The monetary authority
targets the log of nominal output, denoted θt, which is assumed to be generated as an (exogenous)
linear process from a sequence of monetary policy shocks {εt}
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where εt ∼ N (0,1),a n dεt is iid over time. Substituting θt = yt + pt into (1) yields
pi
t = rEi
t (pt)+( 1− r)Ei
t (θt).( 3 )
r thus measures the degree to which individual pricing decisions are strategic complements. As
a consequence of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, r is increasing in the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent goods (i.e. in the degree of competition), and decreasing in the degree of convexity of
the cost function. As the economy becomes perfectly competitive (or as the cost function becomes
linear), r converges to 1.










t = θt + σuui
t; ui
t ∼ N (0,1)
1To emphasize the paper’s main contributions, I abstract from the micro-foundations of market interaction and the
information structure in a rational expectations equilibrium, and simply take the price-setters’ ﬁrst-order condition
as given. See Woodford (2001a) for a detailed discussion motivating the underlying informational assumptions, and
Woodford (2001b) for an analysis of the micro-foundations of household and ﬁrm behavior, on which this model is
based.Public Announcements and the Business Cycle 7
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s=0 are iid processes, independent of each other, as well as of {εt−s}
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s=0) is common knowledge among all price-setters. I make this last
assumption for pure convenience, and for computational reasons. Nothing prevents T from being
very large, in which case we approach an environment, in which θ never becomes fully observable.
It will be convenient to introduce a vector notation for both the fundamental process and the
processes of public and private information: deﬁne Θt as the column vectorof realisations of θ from
period t − T +1up to period t;l e tmt−τ denote the expectation of θt−τ, based on the common
knowledge of {εt−T−s}
∞
s=0,a n dl e tMt denote the vector of mt−τ,f o rτ =0 ,...,T − 1.F i n a l l y ,l e t
Et be the vector of monetary policy shocks from period t − T +1up to period t. Then,
Θt =

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and the monetary policy process can be expressed as
Θt = Mt + σBEt,
where B is some T × T upper-triangular matrix whose entries are derived from (2), with bii =1














































t and Zt denote the vectors of public and private signals available to price-setter i. The vector
of public signals is then written as
Zt = Θt + σvVt.8 C. Hellwig
At time t, the state of the economy is summarized by ({θt−T−s}
∞










I now return to the pricing equation. Averaging (3) over i, and substituting forward yields
pi











(s) (θt) denotes the s-th order average expectation,i . e .Et
(0) (θt)=θt, Et
(1) (θt)=Et (θt)






.I n w o r d s ,
Et
(s) (θt) is the population average expectation of the population average expectation of the ...
(repeat s times) ... of the population average expectation of θt. Note that the average expectations
operator in general does not satisfy the law of iterated expectations; in fact it satisﬁes it if and only
if all available information is public. The average price is given by





and the log of real output yt is given by









The deviation of real GDP from its trend level is therefore a weighted average of the deviation of
all average higher-order expectations. In order to fully derive the dynamics of price and output
adjustments following a monetary policy shock, we need to work out the dynamics of higher-order
average expectations. This is done in two steps: I ﬁr s td e r i v eal i n e a rﬁltering equation for Ei
t (Θt)
as a function of the signal processes Xi
t and Zt. By averaging over the ﬁltering equation, I then
ﬁnd a linear relation between Θt and Et (θt), which is iterated to solve for (5) and (6). These steps
are carried out in the two subsequent lemmas.
2.2 Optimal Filtering
We begin the analysis by deriving a linear ﬁltering equation for Ei
t (Θt). Standard results imply
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u as the relative importance of private information.
A simple way to express Ei
t (Θt) in the required matrix form is to proceed by maximum like-
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Maximizing L with respect to Θt to solve for Ei















which has as a solution
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Lemma 1 For an information structure satisfying the assumptions of the previous section, the
posterior expectation of individual i about Θt satisﬁes
Ei
















It should be noted that maximum likelihood methods can be used to obtain a similar linear
ﬁltering equation far more generally, for instance to account for "learning", i.e. a gradual increase
of the public and private signal precisions over time. Also, note that, if v is an eigenvector of BB0,
with corresponding eigenvalue λ,t h e nv is also an eigenvector of ∆, corresponding to an eigenvalue





.S i n c eBB0 is positive deﬁnite, it follows that all eigenvalues of ∆ are positive
and strictly between 0 and 1. Again, this property can be shown to hold generally.10 C. Hellwig
The matrix ∆ determines the weights that a Bayesian estimate of Θt attributes to past ob-
servations. The coeﬃcients in ∆ only depend on the ratio between Σ and σ2, i.e. the importance
of signal noise relative to fundamental noise. We can thus separate the eﬀects resulting from the
composition of the information structure (parametrized by α)f r o mt h ee ﬀects coming from signal
noise in the inference problem, parametrized by σ2/Σ,a n dt h ee ﬀects of fundamental shocks, i.e.
σ2.
2.3 Higher-order expectations










Lemma 2 Suppose that i’s Bayesian posterior of Θt satisﬁes
Ei
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Proof. From (8), we determine the average expectation:
Et (Θt) − Mt = N1 (Θt − Mt)+N2 (Zt − Mt) (11)
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2Since IT − λN1 is invertible, for |λ| ≤ 1, all the matrix operations below are well-deﬁned.Public Announcements and the Business Cycle 11
and
Et
(s+1) (Θt) − Mt = Ns+1
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t is then given by the ﬁrst entry of (10). As a ﬁrst result, one observes that this dynamic
model delivers (qualitatively and formally) the same implication as the static model of Morris and
Shin (2001): when taking his pricing decision, the price-setter discounts his private information
by a factor (1 − r), and he thus over-reacts to public information (i.e. reacts more than if the
coordination motive were absent).
2.4 Impulse Responses
Applying the previous lemma to the present information structure and averaging over i,w et h e nﬁnd
an expression for pt as a function of the processes of the fundamental and the public information.
The dynamics of price and output adjustment then depend on the dynamic processes of Θt, Zt,
and Xi
t, which can now be substituted to compute the impulse response functions of yt, pi
t,a n dpt
with respect to the shocks εt, ui








(s+1) (Θt) − Mt
i
=[ IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆[(1 − r)α(Θt − Mt)+( 1− α)(Zt − Mt)]
= σ (1 − rα)[IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆BEt
+(1− α)σv [IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆Vt (13)















−(1 − α)σv [IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆Vt (14)
The ﬁr s tr o wo ft h em a t r i x(1 − rα)[IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆B therefore measures the response of
prices to a current or past monetary shock. The impulse response of output and prices to in-
formational shocks is given by the ﬁrst row of (1 − α)σv [IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆.U s i n g ( 9 ) t o s o l v e f o r
(1 − rα)[IT − rα∆]
−1 ∆ gives






,( 1 5 )
where γ ≡ Σ
σ2
1
1−rα. Thus, up to a scaling eﬀect of σ, the impulse response of prices and output
to monetary shocks only depends on γ, which I interpret as an index measuring the importance of
higher-order uncertainty: If αr =0 , then higher-order uncertainty is either irrelevant (r =0implies
that there is no coordination motive) or inexistent (α =0implies that all information is common,
hence there is no higher-order uncertainty). In that case, γ = Σ
σ2, and the impulse responses
correspond to the ones obtained if price-setters set their prices equal to their bayesian estimate of
θt; formally, impulse responses are given by the ﬁltering matrix ∆. Alternatively, if α =1 ,w eﬁnd
ourselves in the environment of maximal higher-order uncertainty, studied by Woodford (2001),
in which γ ≡ Σ
σ2
1
1−r. γ is (i) increasing in Σ
σ2, i.e. the relative importance of signal noise, (ii)
increasing in α, i.e. the relative importance of private information, and (iii) increasing in r,t h e
importance of strategic complementarities. In the extreme case, where r is close to 1 and α =1 ,
i.e. in a highly competitive market with no public information, γ can become arbitrarily large,
even for low values of Σ.S i n c er is a function of the degree of competition, we thus conclude that
more competition lead to more higher-order uncertainty. Furthermore, γ is increasing in σv.(sincePublic Announcements and the Business Cycle 13
an increase in σv raises both α and Σ), and in σu: Taking the derivative of γ with respect to σu,







































When changing σu,t h ee ﬀect of improving information always dominates the compositional eﬀect,
due to an increase in the private information component. A reduction of σu therefore leads to an
overall reduction in higher-order uncertainty, and thus reduces adjustment delays and the exposure
to informational noise.
The impulse responses of output to informational shocks, on the other hand, depend on the
above matrix, as well as a scaling factor (1 − α)σv. Solving as a function of γ and σv, the impulse
response to informational shocks is given by the ﬁrst row of









.( 1 6 )
Apart from a scaling factor σ, the impulse response function thus depends on the one hand on
higher-order uncertainty through γ, on the other hand directly on σ
σv, i.e. the informativeness of
public information relative to the fundamental process. Changing the composition of the informa-
tion structure thus has both a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect on the impulse response of prices
and output to informational shocks.
3M a i n R e s u l t s
General solutions are now easily computable for any given matrix B. Using the previous computa-
















































(17) and (18) illustrate the eﬀect of higher-order uncertainty on the delays in price adjustment:
If γ =0 , i.e. if information is disseminated inﬁnitely quickly, and the fundamental immediately
becomes common knowledge among the price-setters, then prices adjust to the full information level
without delay, and monetary shocks have no eﬀect on output. If γ>0, then there is uncertainty
and a lack of common knowledge of fundamentals. Only then output is aﬀected by monetary
shocks, and higher values of γ lead to longer adjustment delays and more important output eﬀects.
How important output eﬀects are depends on the ex post noise in the information structure and on
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo fp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n :T h em o r ei mportant private information is, the longer the
adjustment delays are, due to higher-order uncertainty. In this respect, the benchmark case where
all information is common and prices are set equal to the Bayesian posterior in each period, provides
an upper bound for the speed of adjustment. Since γ ≥ Σ
σ2, prices adjust less than they would, if
there was no higher-order uncertainty. Higher-order uncertainty thus ampliﬁes price-stickyness.
In addition to the monetary shocks, informational shocks aﬀect prices and output. These
shocks have eﬀects similar to ”supply shocks”, insofar as any increase of prices also leads to a cor-
responding decrease in output. The impact of informational shocks depends positively on γ:T h e
more important higher-order uncertainty is, the more important is the inﬂuence of noise in public
signals. Moreover, holding γ ﬁxed, a decrease in σv also leads to an increase of exposure to informa-
tional noise. As emphasized by Morris and Shin (2001), changes in σv therefore have an ambiguous
eﬀect, for ﬁxed values of r and σu: On the one hand, a decrease in σv decreases higher-order un-
certainty, and therefore reduces delays of price adjustment and informational noise indirectly; on
the other hand, improved public information may lead to an over-exposure to informational noise,
since price-setters over-react to public information. Note that the overall exposure to informational
noise is non-monotonic with respect to σv:I fσv is very large, price-setters pay little attention to
public signals, and hence, informational noise has little eﬀect on output. When σv is very small,
there is little ﬁrst and higher-order uncertainty about Θt, which means that price-setters are ablePublic Announcements and the Business Cycle 15
to react almost immediately to monetary shocks, and coordinate their price adjustments. 3
To complete the discussion, I brieﬂy comment on the eﬀects of r close to 1, i.e. a high degree
of strategic complementarities, or market competition. We have already observed that this leads
to large values of γ, and hence to more delays in price adjustment, however note that in the special
case where α =1 , i.e. in a highly competitive market with no common information, prices can take
arbitrarily long to adjust, even when the private information is very precise.
In the remainder of this section, I illustrate these points explicitly, by setting T =1and T =2 ,
and solving in closed form. I then show numerical solutions for impulse responses, when T is large.
3.1 T =1
The case T =1provides a simple extension of the static model of Morris and Shin (2001) into a
dynamic contexts. In this case, B =[ 1 ] , and it can easily be checked that
h





−1. Writing the current average price and output as functions of the aggregate shocks, we
ﬁnd


















Substituting (19) into (20), one obtains




Since pt − mt is unexpected inﬂation, (21) is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve.4 The
slope of the Phillips curve depends on higher-order uncertainty. Thus, as higher-order uncertainty
increases (γ increases), output becomes more sensitive to unexpected inﬂation.
3The same discussion applies, if we consider a reduction of σu and σv in equal proportions, i.e. reduce Σ while
holding α ﬁxed, or if we hold Σ ﬁxed, while reducing α, i.e. increase the public information component of the
information structure.
4Similar expressions can be derived in the general case. In that case, mt no longer corresponds to the common
expected price level, since some public information was revealed, without the fundamental becoming common knowl-
edge. Lagged price and output levels therefore also enter into the equation to account for the unanticipated current
eﬀects of past monetary shocks.16 C. Hellwig
The short-run volatilities of unexpected inﬂation and output are






















whereas the correlation between output and unexpected inﬂation is











The variance of output is increasing in γ.T h ee ﬀect of γ on the variance of inﬂation is ambiguous:
If γ is large, inﬂation volatility is mostly due to informational shocks, in which case, reducing γ
reduces the volatility of inﬂation. If γ is small, inﬂation volatility is mostly due to noise in the
monetary policy process, and reducing γ increases the short-run response of prices to monetary
shocks. Finally, we observe that the model generally predicts a positive correlation between output
and unexpected inﬂation, unless α =0 , i.e. when there is no element of private information.
Full information revelation after one period precludes the discussion of any meaningful dynamics
and persistence of shocks, since prices fully adjust after one period. To understand the eﬀects of
the informational parameters on adjustment dynamics, I therefore turn to the case, where T =2 .
3.2 T =2
Let b denote the eﬀect of a past monetary shock on the current value of θ,o r























1+γ + γb2 γb
γb 1+γ
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Substituting into (17) and (18), we ﬁnd



















































































Ad e c r e a s ei nγ increases the response of prices to both current and past monetary shocks. On
the other hand, the coeﬃcients on vt and vt−1 are increasing in γ so that reducing higher-order
uncertainty also leads to a reduction of the eﬀects of current adn past informational shocks on
output. However, as we have observed in the case where T =1 , a reduction in σv m a ya c t u a l l yl e a d
to an increase in the eﬀect of informational noise on output, if public information is very diﬀuse.
We conclude that the results that were highlighted before apply to both current and past monetary
and informational shocks.
3.3 Large T
In this section, I numerically solve for the impulse response function in the case of an example
where T =3 0is set suﬃciently large, so that by the time a monetary shock becomes common
knowledge, it has almost entirely been factored into pricing decisions. I follow Woodford in the
speciﬁcation of the monetary policy process, assuming that
∆θt = ρ∆θt−1 + σεt (24)
i.e. the ﬁrst diﬀerence of nominal GDP follows an AR(1)-process. To illustrate the eﬀects, I ﬁx
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Figure 1: Monetary Shocks, (5,10)
illustrate the comparative statics eﬀects that were identiﬁed above. The ﬁgures below plot impulse
responses to monetary and informational shocks for values of (σu,σv) of (5,10), (3.33,20), (5,1)
and (5,100).T h e ﬁrst two pairs of parameters yield a value of γ =6 2 .5, and hence illustrate
the eﬀects of compositional changes that leave the degree of higher-order uncertainty unchanged,
the last two pairs illustrate the eﬀect of changes in σv, when compared with the ﬁrst. We observe
that the reduction in higher-order uncertainty associated with improved public information leads to
faster price adjustment, we also observe that the exposure to informational noise is non-monotonic,
and tends to be largest for intermediate values of σv.
As was already observed by Woodford, it comes as a property of any incomplete information
model of price adjustment that output peaks before inﬂation does, since it takes time for a monetary
policy shock not only to become knowledge, but common knowledge among price-setters. The above
graphs illustrate that this feature, which is in line with empirical VAR estimations, for example
by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [6], is robust to changes in the information structure. As a
quantitatively testable description of nominal adjustment following a monetary shock, the present
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Figure 8: Informational Shock, (5,100)
incomplete information, as well as abstracting from other shocks. Note however, that the delays
in price adjustment, and hence the lead of output eﬀects before price eﬀects is entirely based on
learning. One should thus expect that to the extent that other shocks are also subject to higher-
order uncertainty, the impulse responses they generate will exhibit similar features.
4 Supply Shocks
So far, the analysis focused on the eﬀects of monetary shocks, and incomplete information about
the monetary policy process. As noted by Woodford (2001a), restricting the analysis to a unique
source of shocks highlights the fact that in contrast with Lucas’ original model, the existence of an
additional source of noise is not necessary to generate incomplete nominal adjustment; rather the
presence of higher-order uncertainty along with strategic complementarities is suﬃcient to generate
output eﬀects; moreover, higher-order uncertainty leads to substantial persistence. The model,
however, can easily be augmented to allow for supply shocks, as well as higher-order uncertainty
about the latter, which leads to some interesting additional insights.Public Announcements and the Business Cycle 23
I therefore augment the model by assuming that the level of potential output, yt,f o l l o w sa
linear stochastic process, again allowing for some ﬁnite degree of integration. In this case, (1)




t (pt)+( 1− r)Ei
t (yt − yt) (25)
The model can be solved using the same techniques as in section 2. Averaging (25), then substituting
forward to express pt and yt as functions of the exogenous precesses θt and yt yields























To solve (26) and (27) explicitly for impulse responses to monetary, real and informational shocks,
on can again proceed along the same lines as section 2.
To interpret (26) and (27), note that θt−yt is the market-clearing price level that would prevail
under common knowledge of the two processes. The realized price level pt is therefore a weighted
average of average higher-order expectations of the full-information market-clearing price. yt can
be decomposed into a component due to monetary shocks and a weighted average of higher-order
expectations concerning the potential output level. The ﬁrst component reﬂects the incomplete
nominal adjustment. The second term is new, and is due to ﬂuctations in potential GDP that
do not become common knowledge. Because of higher-order uncertainty, real GDP responds only
sluggishly to variations in potential GDP. Moreover, the stronger the coordination motive, the
stronger the delays in adjustment. The analysis thus suggests that higher-order uncertainty may
possibly account for the persistence of shocks other than monetary shocks; such as technology
shocks. In the extreme case, where r is close to 1 and factor-speciﬁc higher-order uncertainty is
important, output potentially remains far from the potential level for a long time.
Since we can separate the eﬀects of θt and yt, assuming an information structure as above
for each of the two components leads to identical impulse response functions as previously.5 Real
5More generally, if the processes for θt and yt are correlated (for example when the monetary authority in part
responds to its own estimate of the output gap), the techniques of lemma 1 and 2 can be used to derive higher-order
expectations about the full-information market-clearing price.24 C. Hellwig
disturbances have the same, but opposite eﬀect on prices as they have on output, however, the
output gap yt − yt responds to real shocks as it does to nominal disturbances. Most importantly,
the factor-speciﬁc degree of higher-order uncertainty determines to what extent a disturbance has
persistent eﬀects on prices and output. I conclude this discussion by observing that, although
higher-order uncertainty may well explain the persistence of shocks, it is unable to account for
ampliﬁcation, at least in the short run: Since higher-order expectations are much more sluggish in
responding to current information than ﬁrst-order expectations are, the eﬀects of a supply shock
on output are dampened rather than ampliﬁed.
5 Some Preliminary Thoughts on Monetary Policy
The previous discussion has highlighted the impact of the information structure on the output-
inﬂation trade-oﬀ. In this section, I study the welfare eﬀects of information provision by the
Central Bank. A recurring theme in the scientiﬁc debate about the optimal conduct of monetary
policy is the role of Central Bank transparency, i.e. the desirability of supplying the private sector
with precise information about (i) the objectives of monetary policy, (ii) the macro-economic data
on which the central bank bases its decisions, and (iii) the actions taken by the central bank. The
main argument in favor of monetary transparency is based on the need to monitor: The better
the information provided, the easier it is to evaluate the Central Bank’s behavior ex post and
analyze whether the policy objectives have been met. Transparency is thus necessary to monitor
whether or not the Central Bank adheres to implicit or explicit rules that govern the Principal
Agent relationship between the society and the central bank. This is emphasized in particular in
the context of inﬂation targeting, where an independent central bank retains full authority over its
policy actions, and is held accountable for them.6
In this section, I discuss the eﬀects of transparent monetary policy in the present model. An
important source of information that price-setting ﬁrms have access is the central bank, either
through direct disclosures, or through its policy actions. Hence, an immediate implication of the
previous results is that the information the central bank provides to the public not only has a role
for monitoring purposes, but also has a direct inﬂuence on coordination among price-setters, and
6see Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Svensson (1997) for discussions of inﬂation targeting that emphasize the
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hence the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ.T h i scoordination eﬀect of information provision is the focus
of this section. Formally, I embed the present model into a simple model of monetary policy a la
Barro and Gordon (1983), taking the aggregate demand process as in part under the central bank’s
control. The analysis is far from being exhaustive, the main purpose being that of showing that by
augmenting the previous model by a formalization of the central bank’s objective, we have a natural
framework in which to formally study the role the interplay between transparency, monetary policy,
and the market’s information structure.
To fully understand the role of transparency, it is important to tie this notion to parameters
of the information structure. Here, I adopt the view that a higher degree of transparency means a
higher degree of ”common knowledge”; within the model, this is achieved by a better provision of
public information. This view is also taken by Morris and Shin (2001). The motivation behind this
use of the term ”transparency” lies in the fact that public information coordinates the market’s ﬁrst-
and higher-order expectations, whereas private information doesn’t (see Hellwig 2000 for results
linking the information structure to higher-order uncertainty).
5.1 Transparency as an Implicit Commitment Device
In this section, I study the role of transparency in an environment, where the central bank can-
not commit to a particular policy rule. The monitoring role of transparency in the commitment
literature was already highlighted; here I show that in an environment characterized by discretion,
transparency can act as an implicit commitment device: Even if the central bank is discretionary
and tries to use monetary policy to stimulate output, the provision of precise public information de-
creases the eﬀectiveness of pro-active monetary policy, and hence serves as an implicit commitment
device that reduces the inﬂationary bias. However, improved public information also comes at a
cost, since a reduction of the variance of public information raises the macro-economic exposure to
informational shocks, at least in environments with a high degree of informational noise; and the
higher the pressure put on the central bank to stimulate output, the more it has an incentive to
commit to the provision of precise public information.
To illustrate this point formally, consider the previous model, with T =1for simplicity. Sup-
pose that a discretionary central bank controls the growth rate of nominal GDP with some noise;26 C. Hellwig
i.e. θt satisﬁes
θt = θt−1 + µt + εt (28)
where µt is under the central bank’s control, and εt is a monetary policy shock. In each period, the
central bank has a target for the growth of θ and for real aggregate output, i.e. it minimizes with
respect to {µt}
∞




where β<1 is the discount rate, and the per period loss function is
L(µt)=Et (θt − θt−1)
2 + bEt (yt − y∗)
2 ,
taking as given the private expectations about the present and future conduct of monetary policy.
The output target y∗ may be diﬀerent from the potential output level, which is normalized to 0.
The use of a money growth target instead of an inﬂation target in the loss function is made for
convenience, it eliminates any dynamic eﬀects resulting from the choice of µt.A ni n ﬂation target
would lead to the same results, but is technically more involved since the eﬀects of discretionary
monetary policy on inﬂation are spread over two periods: immediately through unexpected inﬂation
in the current period, and once the information about the growth of nominal GDP is commonly
available (i.e. the following period), through higher anticipated inﬂation. Here, I abstract from
this additional complication.
Price-setters form expectations µe
t about the central bank’s course of action, and set prices
according to the noisy information available about the realization of θt. Going along the same lines
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As a function of µt, the loss function can thus be rewritten as
L(µt)=µ2
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which, together with the rational expectations hypothesis that µe































Hence, the inﬂationary bias is increasing in γ, the degree of higher-order uncertainty about θt.T h e
expected loss can be decomposed into three components: The ﬁrst measures the cost due to the
inﬂationary bias, the second measures the cost due to monetary shocks, and the last component is
due to informational noise. We observe that the ﬁrst two components are decreasing in γ (and hence
in σ2
v), but changes in σ2
v have ambiguous eﬀects on the loss due to informational noise: If σ2
v is large,
the increase of exposure to informational noise that results from a reduction in σ2
v dominates the
reduction of higher-order uncertainty, while for small values of σ2
v, the opposite is true. Maximizing
EL with respect to σ2
v then necessarily leads to a corner solution: Ideally, the central bank would
want to set σ2
v as close to zero as possible; i.e. provide very precise public information (be very
transparent): this eliminates higher-order uncertainty, and therefore the eﬀects of monetary shocks
on output as well as the inﬂationary bias. In practice, it may well be impossible to pursue such
an information policy; rather, there is some lower bound on σ2
v. In that case, it may be optimal
to provide no public information at all, to insure the market against informational risk, while at
t h es a m et i m ea c c e p t i n gm o r eh i g h e r - o r der uncertainty. At what lower bound on σ2
v it becomes
optimal to commit to transparent provision of information depends on the output target: The more
biased the output target is, the more the central bank has an incentive to provide precise public
information.
5.2 Policy Targets and the Information Structure
We can use the insights of this model to discuss the impact of the monetary regime on the infor-
mation structure, and hence the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ. The literature on monitoring monetary28 C. Hellwig
policy usually advocates that policy should be conducted within a framework that provides well-
speciﬁed targets. The beneﬁcial eﬀects of such a framework and of policy targets with respect to
the information structure are easily understood: The framework, as well as the targets, reduce
higher-order uncertainty about the central bank’s objectives, and hence about the course of its
policy conduct. Formally, speciﬁc targets eliminate higher-order uncertainty about the the values
of y∗ and b in the central banker’s objective function, and hence reduce higher-order uncertainty
about the resulting policy variable θt.
In addition, the targets themselves act to coordinate expectations about the targeted variables;
within the model, they act as a public signal about policy. A similar role of coordinating expec-
tations is played by published forecasts. Svensson’s interpretation of inﬂation targets as inﬂation
forecast targets (i.e. the central bank should design its policy so that its forecast of inﬂation is
consistent with the target, cf. Svensson (1997)) captures precisely this idea: to the extent that
forecasts are unbiased, they act as a public signal about inﬂation. Monetary regimes typically
diﬀer about what variable is targeted, and hence also about the degree of higher-order uncertainty
about prices. In the terminology of our model, a regime that targets money growth reduces higher-
order uncertainty about θt,a ni n ﬂation target aﬀects higher-order uncertainty about prices. As
was observed in (26), the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ depends on higher-order uncertainty about the
”full-information market-clearing price-level”; since the inﬂation target provides a public signal
about the latter, one would conjecture that an inﬂation target is more beneﬁcial in terms of its
informational eﬀect than a money growth target.
5.3 The Signaling Role of Monetary Policy
Finally, the model points to the role that central bank transparency may have in stabilizing output
following supply shocks: The analysis in the previous section has highlighted the possibility that in
an environment characterized by a high degree of strategic complementarities, adverse supply shocks
can have highly persistent output eﬀects, if there is higher-order uncertainty; in other words, even if
everyone privately believes that potential output is higher, output remains depressed because of low
higher-order expectations. In this case, transparency about supply shocks may also be beneﬁcial,
since the creation of common expectations about output reduces the persistence of the eﬀects of
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The provision of public information about supply shocks can come through two channels: First,
such information may come from the provision of public forecasts of potential output or the output
gap. Second, even if such forecasts are not public, some information becomes available, if the
central bank conditions monetary policy on its own estimate of the supply shock. If higher-order
uncertainty is small, the "surprise" eﬀect of monetary policy on output is small; nevertheless, the
central bank may want to condition its policy on its estimates of potential output, if this increases
welfare by coordinating expectations about the potential output level. 7
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Building on Woodford (2001), this paper has developed a model of monetary business cycles, in
which higher-order uncertainty about the fundamental driving processes, coupled with strategic
complementarities between price-setters leads to potentially long adjustment delays for prices after
monetary shocks and hence to important short-run eﬀects on output. The main motivation of the
analysis was to discuss the eﬀect of the information structure on the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ;
speciﬁcally, the model showed how price stickiness becomes more important, the more relevant
higher-order uncertainty is (quantiﬁable as a function of the information structure and of the
degree of strategic complementarities). The provision of precise public information thus accelerates
nominal adjustment, but potentially comes at the cost of a higher exposure to informational noise.
Finally, embedding the nominal adjustment model in a simple version of the monetary policy model
a la Barro and Gordon (1983) shows how the provision of precise public information may serve as
an implicit commitment device against inﬂationary biases.
The results in this paper have several positive, normative, and empirical implications. The
comparative statics results rely more on the context of strategic complementarities with incom-
p l e t ei n f o r m a t i o nt h a no nt h es p e c i ﬁc environment studied. The conclusions about the role of the
information structure therefore should be expected to extend to other contexts of decision-making
7This idea mirrors results in Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2002), who study the informational role of policy
choices in a global coordination game with multiple equilibria under common knowledge. In their environment, the
information conveyed by the policy choice enables the market to coordinate on one of multiple equilibria, and this
multiplicity is the root cause of the policy traps discussed in that paper. Here, the preferences of the central bank
are aligned with those of the price-setters, and hence inducing better coordination will be beneﬁcial from the central
bank’s point of view.30 C. Hellwig
with strategic complementarities. Nor are the eﬀects of higher-order uncertainty tied to the nature
of the shock; the model suggests that higher-order uncertainty can lead to persistence of any kind
of shock. Woodford’s insight about monetary shocks may therefore be helpful in understanding
persistence in other environments as well, for example of technology shocks in an RBC model.
Among the normative aspects of the analysis, I have highlighted the role of transparency as
providing commitment against inﬂationary biases; I should also mention the negative impact that
the degree of competition has on higher-order uncertainty: The higher the elasticity of substitution
between products is, the more important the strategic complementarities between prices are, and
the slower the nominal adjustment after a monetary shock. The positive eﬀects of increasing
competition are therefore in part oﬀs e tb yan e g a t i v ew e l f a r ee ﬀect due to higher persistence of
shocks.
The paper furthermore leads to potentially testable empirical implications: In particular, it
points to the eﬀects of the monetary policy regime on the information structure, and raises the
question whether there is an empirical link between the way monetary policy is conducted and the
inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ. The informational parameters can potentially be estimated from time-
series data, which leads to the question whether the changes in information processing over the
last 20 years have changed the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ, or have otherwise altered the transmission
channels of monetary policy. There seems to be at least informal evidence about how the underlying
parameters have shifted: Morris and Shin (2001), for example suggest that changes in the use of
the media have reduced informational noise, but have also raised the public information component
in ﬁnancial markets (lowered α), while the conventional wisdom on product market liberalization
suggests an increase in r.8 Furthermore, evidence in Stock and Watson (2002) suggests that the
variance of underlying shocks has decreased; what remains unclear is how these reductions in the
variance of shocks compare to the reduction in informational noise, i.e. the ratio σ2
Σ . How these
changes have altered the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ and the exposure to informational noise remains
a priori ambiguous.
Estimating the informational parameters (and possibly testing for their changes) is also of
8In his account of Greenspan’s activity at the Fed, Woodward suggests based on discussions with the Fed chairman
that starting in the mid-90’s, increased competition prevented ﬁrms from responding to a loosening of monetary policy
by raising prices. While I haven’t found any similar evidence in the academic literature, the statement seems to be
broadly consistent with the view that an increase in r l e dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nγ during the 90’s.Public Announcements and the Business Cycle 31
interest with respect to the recent debate on the decline of US output volatility (see Blanchard and
Simon, 2001, or Stock and Watson, 2002, for an overview). These papers try to determine to what
extent changes in the conduct of monetary policy have contributed to stabilize output growth, and
the theoretical contribution of this paper suggests that the monetary policy changes of the 1980’s,
to the extent that they have altered the information structure, have inﬂuenced output volatility
not only through the redeﬁnition of policy objectives, but also through their direct eﬀect on the
structural parameters.
It should be noted that, as a descriptive model of monetary business cycles, the present model
is highly simpliﬁed, and relies on information as the unique transmission channel for shocks. The
analysis relies on informational assumptions, which, although more complex than Woodford’s, are
very simplistic. The methodology, however, can easily be adapted to more complex information
structures that involve a gradual learning of the process, or a shift from private to public information
over time. The model relied on (i) the linearity of best responses, which by forward substitution
led to an expression of strategic variables as weighted sums of higher-order expectations about the
underlying fundamental processes, and (ii) on the derivation of average expectations out of the
information structure. Average expectations can easily be computed for any kind of environment,
by ﬁrst deriving a ﬁltering equation like (8) for the fundamental process, and then using the ﬁltering
equation to relate average expectations about the fundamentals to the fundamental process itself;
iteration to higher orders then completes the procedure.
Due to its ﬂexibility, the present model of higher-order uncertainty might therefore be useful
as a vehicle for studying the role of the information structure in various other dynamic contexts,
starting with a more exhaustive analysis of the role of transparency in the conduct of monetary
policy. Another empirically appealing extention might be to combine the analysis of incomplete
information with sticky prices a la Calvo (1983). As was discussed before, the incomplete informa-
tion model can replicate the ﬁnding of VAR estimations that following a monetary shock, output
peaks prior to inﬂation; however the model cannot account for persistent eﬀects on output and
inﬂation beyond the point at which the initial shock becomes common knowledge. Combining the
incomplete information with some forms of price or investment rigidities might therefore lead to
a further increase of the persistence of inﬂation. A combination of incomplete information with
rigid price adjustment might also be helpful for a theoretical understanding of the insights drawn
from the ”new Keynesian” models, where the forward-looking nature of pricing decisions relies on32 C. Hellwig
a strong inter-temporal coordination of expectations. Whether such coordination of expectations
remains feasible in the presence of informational diﬀerences is a yet unresolved question.
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